Imagine a fleet of electric buses, silently gliding through city streets, only to suddenly come to a halt—not due to traffic or mechanical failure, but because someone halfway across the world decided to shut them down. This isn’t science fiction; it’s a real concern Danish authorities are scrambling to address. Hundreds of Chinese-made electric buses in Denmark, like those in Norway, have a security loophole that allows remote deactivation, raising alarms about potential vulnerabilities in public transportation systems.
But here’s where it gets controversial: The issue isn’t just about buses. It’s about the broader implications of relying on technology from countries with vastly different values and priorities. Danish authorities are now racing to close this loophole after Norwegian transport officials discovered that the Chinese manufacturer, Yutong, retained remote access to the buses’ control systems for software updates and diagnostics. While this access was intended for maintenance, it could theoretically be exploited to disrupt operations—a chilling thought for anyone relying on public transit.
In Norway, the public transport authority Ruter took swift action, testing the buses in an isolated environment. And this is the part most people miss: While removing the buses’ SIM cards could prevent remote deactivation, it would also disconnect them from essential systems, leaving authorities in a Catch-22. Ruter’s CEO, Bernt Reitan Jenssen, emphasized the urgency of the situation, stating that national and local authorities must implement additional measures to mitigate risks.
Denmark’s largest public transport company, Movia, operates 469 Chinese electric buses, with 262 manufactured by Yutong. Jeppe Gaard, Movia’s COO, highlighted that this isn’t a problem unique to Chinese buses. Here’s the bold truth: Any vehicle or device with Chinese electronics built in could face similar vulnerabilities if its software systems have web access. The Danish agency for civil protection warned that these buses are equipped with internet-connected subsystems, including cameras, microphones, and GPS, which could be exploited to disrupt operations.
Yutong has defended its practices, claiming compliance with EU data protection laws and asserting that vehicle data stored in an AWS datacenter in Frankfurt is used solely for maintenance and customer service. However, critics like Thomas Rohden, chair of the Danish China-Critical Society, argue that Denmark has been “way too slow” in addressing its dependence on Chinese companies. Here’s the thought-provoking question: In an era of geopolitical tensions and hybrid threats, is it wise to rely so heavily on technology from a country with fundamentally different values?
As Denmark and Norway grapple with this issue, the debate extends beyond buses. It’s about national resilience, technological sovereignty, and the risks of global supply chains. What do you think? Are the benefits of affordable, innovative technology worth the potential security risks? Let’s discuss in the comments—this is a conversation we can’t afford to ignore.
